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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//2A-8/9/83 
NIAGARA COUNTY LEGISLATURE and 
COUNTY OF NIAGARA. 
Respondent. 
^ahd- CASE NO^ U^ 6~2^ 5 
NIAGARA COUNTY WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYEES 
UNIT. LOCAL 832. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
NEGOTIATION CONSULTANTS AND CO. (EARL C. KNIGHT, 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. (STEPHEN J. 
WILEY, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the Niagara County 
White Collar Employees Unit. Local 832. Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc. (CSEA). It alleges that it had 
an agreement with the County of Niagara which expired on 
December 31. 1981. It further alleges that no successor 
agreement had been negotiated as of July 29. 1982, the day 
on which the newly enacted §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law 
became effective. The statute then provided that "[i]t 
shall be an improper practice for a public employer or its 
agents deliberately . . . to refuse to continue all the 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is 
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negotiated."- The charge alleges that thereafter, on 
August 3, 1982, the County Legislature issued a legislative 
determination prescribing terms and conditions of employment 
for unit employees for the period between January 1, 1982. 
through December 31, 1982, which altered some of the terms 
of the agreement that had expired on December 31. 1981.— 
CSEA contends that the legislative determination constituted 
a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge on the ground 
that the action of the County Legislature was not proscribed 
by §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. He gave two reasons for 
this action. One was that the conduct of the County 
Legislature was specifically authorized by §209.3(e) of the 
Taylor Law which permits the legislative body of the public 
employer involved in a negotiation dispute to resolve a 
deadlock by taking "such action as it deems to be in the 
public interest, including the interest of the public 
employees involved." The second was that the County 
i/The statute was amended after the charge was filed 
and the hearing officer's decision was issued. The 
language of that amendment and its implications are 
discussed later. 
2/Among other things, the legislative determination 
revised the recognition clause, added provisions to the 
management rights clause, deleted an agency shop fee and 
altered provisions relating to wages, hours, health 
insurance and personal leave. 
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Legislature was performing a function that was exclusively 
legislative when it resolved the negotiation deadlock and 
that this Board cannot review such actions. The matter now 
comes to us on the exceptions of CSEA. 
The parties are in agreement that the question before 
us is "whether, in the course of resolving an impasse under 
Civil Service Law §209.3(e), the legislative body of a 
public employer is precluded, by virtue of Chapter 868 of 
the Laws of 1982 [§209-a.1(e)] from imposing a settlement 
which changes the terms of an expired collectively 
negotiated agreement." 
Answering in the negative, the County argues that 
§209-a.l(e) takes its place along side the preexisting 
§209.3(e) and does not replace it. According to the County, 
the two provisions should be read in concert as providing 
that a public employer cannot refuse to abide by the terms 
of an expired agreement until that agreement is replaced 
either by a new agreement or by a substitute for a new 
agreement that is imposed pursuant to other provisions of 
3/ the Taylor Law.— CSEA argues, however, that a proper 
^/in addition to permitting the imposition of terms 
and conditions of employment by a legislative determination 
where the public employer is a government other than an 
educational institution (§209.3(f)). the Taylor Law also 
permits their imposition by an arbitration panel where the 
public employees are policemen or firefighters who work for 
certain departments of local government. 
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reading of the two provisions of the Taylor Law in concert 
limits a legislative body acting pursuant to §209.3(e) to 
dealing with matters not covered by an expired agreement. 
The language of §209-a.l(e) and its legislative history 
4/ pursuade us that CSEA's reading is the correct one.— 
Dealing with the language firslT.§209-a7T(ey~provides^that^a 
public employer may not refuse to continue all the terms of 
an expired agreement until "a new agreement is negotiated". 
Section 201.12 of the Taylor Law defines the term 
"agreement" to mean "the result of the exchange of mutual 
promises between the chief executive officer of a public 
employer and an employee organization which becomes a 
binding contract . . . ." A legislative determination made 
pursuant to §209.3(e) clearly does not satisfy this 
definition.— 
Reacting to this implication of the new statutory 
language, many of the representatives of public employers 
urged the Governor to veto the legislation, at least in 
part, because it would limit the role of legislative bodies 
^Significant parts of this legislative history were 
not before the hearing officer. It came into existence 
when the new enactment was amended by Chapter 921 of the 
Laws of 1982, effective December 20, 1982. 
JL/see County of Suffolk. 12 PERB ir3014 (1979) and 
Fairview Fire District. 13 PERB 1f3l02 (1980). 
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acting under §209.3(e).- Notwithstanding their 
complaints, the Governor signed the bill. However, he noted 
the concerns expressed by public employers in his approval 
memorandum, and he stated that he had received assurances 
from the Legislature that there would be a chapter amendment 
prov id ing t h a t a p u b l i c emp 1 oyer ' s^oVutyYo abide by^The 
terms of an expired agreement would extend only until a new 
agreement is negotiated "or negotiations are resolved 
pursuant to the procedures established in §209 or pursuant 
to §212 of this article."-/ 
There was an extraordinary session of the State 
Legislature in December 1982, during the course of which a 
bill amending §209-a.l(e) was introduced at the request of 
the Governor. It would have amended the language to make it 
improper for a public employer 
to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired 
agreement until a new agreement is negotiated or 
negotiations are resolved pursuant to the 
procedures established in section two hundred nine 
or pursuant to section two hundred twelve of this 
article, unless the employee organization which is 
a party to such agreement has, during such 
negotiations or prior to such resolution of such 
negotiations, engaged in conduct violative of 
subdivision one of section two hundred ten of this 
^Relevant excerpts from their letters are found in 
Appendix A. 
2/The anticipated amendment was also intended to 
relieve public employers of a duty to abide by the terms of 
an expired agreement if the employee organization engaged 
in a strike. The relevant language of the Governor's 
approval memorandum is found in Appendix B. 
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article. (The underscored matter is that which 
the bill would have added.) 
The bill was not passed in the form proposed by the Governor. 
Rather, the Legislature amended it to delete the words "or 
negotiations are resolved pursuant to the procedures 
established in section two hundred nine or pursuant to section 
two hundred twelve of this article,". The deleted language is 
precisely that which the Governor sought in order to permit 
legislative determinations to supersede expired agreements. 
All that survived of the amendment proposed by the Governor 
was the language of the bill relieving a public employer from 
an obligation to abide by the terms of an expired agreement if 
an employee organization engaged in a strike. 
A colloquy on the floor of the Assembly indicates that 
the bill, as submitted by the Governor, was amended, not 
because of a sense that the law already treated legislative 
determinations as having the same effect as negotiated 
agreements, but in order to satisfy union opposition to the 
8 / 
Governor's proposal.- The Director of the Governor's 
Office of Employee Relations recognized that the bill as 
passed did not accomplish the purposes of the Governor. 
Focusing on the language "such resolution of such 
I/The explanation of the amendment was given by 
Assembly Majority Leader Daniel B. Walsh, the sponsor of the 
July 29th bill. Page 130 of the record of proceedings of the 
Assembly for Wednesday. December 15, 1982. contains the 
relevant colloquy. It is found in Appendix C. 
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negotiations" (emphasis in original), he noted in a memorandum 
to the Counsel to the Governor on December 20. 1982 that "such 
resolution" must refer to the aforementioned new agreement. 
He therefore recommended that the bill be recalled and the 
word "such" be amended to read "any" or that the bill be 
disapproved. Notwithstanding his recommendation^, the^bill wasT 
approved. 
The legislative history which we have recited in 
considerable detail, and most particularly the introduction of 
the Governor's proposed amendment at the extraordinary session 
and its rejection by the Legislature, support the conclusion 
that is inherent in the plain meaning of the words found in 
§209-a.l(e). A public employer is required to abide by the 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated. For the purpose of the new law, a legislative 
determination made pursuant to §209.3(e) is not the equivalent 
9/ 
of a negotiated agreement.— 
.t/This reading of the new statute does not require a 
conclusion that it repealed §209.3(e). As acknowledged by 
CSEA, a legislative body is still free to impose terms and 
conditions of employment not dealt with in the expired 
agreement. It may also impose the terms and conditions of 
employment contained in the prior agreement for an additional 
year, thereby foreclosing further negotiations for that time 
period. (See Bethlehem CSD #6. 5 PERB ^3010 [1972].) 
Further, an employee organization may consent to the issuance 
of a legislative determination by a legislative body or to a 
determination by a public arbitration panel, in which event 
it would waive its right to require the public employer to 
abide by the terms of the expired agrement. Finally, if an 
employee organization strikes, a public employer need not 
abide by an expired agreement thereafter. 
•w S%Jf. 
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Having reversed the hearing officer's determination 
that §209.3(e) of the Taylor Law permits the legislative 
body of Niagara County to issue a determination altering the 
terms of an expired agreement, we also reject his 
determination that the action of a county legislature is 
beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. The hearing officer 
based this determination upon decisions holding that the 
action of a legislative body cannot, by itself, constitute a 
violation of §209-a.l(d),— which declares it to be 
improper for a public employer "to refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with the duly recognized or certified 
representatives of its public employees." The basis of 
these decisions, however, is not that actions of a 
legislative body are beyond the jurisdiction of this 
Board,— but that legislative action cannot, by itself, 
constitute a violation of the duty to negotiate in good 
faith because no duty to negotiate is imposed upon 
legislative bodies. 
1^/This principle does not apply where the public 
employer is structured so that its legislative and 
executive body are one and the same. Jefferson County 
Board of Supervisors. 6 PERB ir3031 (1973). modified on 
other grounds. Jefferson County Board of Supervisors v. 
PERB. 44 AD2d 893 (4th Dept.. 1974). 7 PERB T7009 (1974). 
affirmed as modified, 36 NY2d 534, 8 PERB f7008 (1375). 
ii/see County of Suffolk, 15 PERB ir3021 (1982). in 
which the adoption of resolutions by a county legislature 
were held to interfere with the rights of public employees 
and therefore to violate §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. 
^ 
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The decisions that the hearing officer relied upon in 
reaching this conclusion apply to §209-a.l(d). They are not 
relevant here. The Taylor Law makes a sharp distinction 
between the roles of the executive and legislative branches 
of government only with respect to §209-a.l(d) and the duty 
to negotiate.— No such dis11hctionTTsT drawn wfth 
respect to the other conduct prohibited by §209-a.l of the 
Taylor Law. The prohibitions of §209-a.l(e). like those of 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c). apply to both the executive and 
legislative branches of a public employer. 
Accordingly, we find that the legislative determination 
made by the legislature of the County of Niagara constitutes 
) a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law in that it 
13/ 
changed terms of an agreement that had expired.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the respondent to: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to 
continue the terms of an expired 
12/city of Kingston. 15 PERB ir8009 (1982). confirmed 
City of Kingston v. PERB. not officially reported (Sup. 
Ct.. Albany County. 1983). 16 PERB T7002. See also City of 
Kingston v. Quick, not officially reported (Sup. Ct. . 
Albany County. 1983), 16 PERB T7007. 
H/Although not specifically raised by the parties, 
the case raises the issue whether a finding of a violation 
constitutes retroactive application of §209-a.l(e). This 
issue has been considered by us in Cobleskill. 16 PERB 
1f3057. In that case we concluded that the statute was not 
being applied retroactively if a public employer refuses to 
abide by the terms of an expired agreement after the 
statute became effective. This is so even though the 
agreement had expired before the statute became effective. 
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agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated; 
2. Rescind immediately the legislative 
determination of August 3. 1982 to the 
extent that it changes or modifies any 
of the terms of the agreement which 
expired December 31, 1981 and to 
restore simultaneously all terms of 
that agreement, making whole all unit 
employees and CSEA for any loss or 
diminution of benefits including 
interest on any sums owing to unit 
employees at the rate of 3 percent per 
annum from August 3. 1982 to 
December 31. 1982 and at the rate of 9 
percent per annum thereafter; and 
3. Sign and post notice in the form 
attached at all work locations normally 
used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: August 9, 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
•feSA 
V ill 
APPENDIX A 
The Unified Court System wrote to the Counsel to the 
Governor on July 26, 1982: 
By requiring the continuance of all terms of an 
agreement until a new agreement is negotiated, 
it would act to deprive the uniformed services 
of the statutory right (section 209(4) of the 
Taylor Law) to pursue binding interest 
arbitration, and local government of its right 
to impose a legislative determination (Section 
209(3 Hey) irT Tieu^ of~~ar contract-iro resolvean 
impasse. (emphasis in original) 
The School Boards Association wrote on July 13. 1982: 
[T]he bill would apparently repeal sub silencio 
some of the Taylor Law's carefully developed 
impasse resolution procedures . . . . While 
the bill does not speak expressly to the 
impasse procedure, its requirement that public 
employers "continue all the terms of the 
expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated" (emphasis added) has the effect of 
prohibiting legislative determination of the 
terms and conditions of public employment 
following an impasse in negotiation. 
The Conference of Mayors wrote on July 21, 1982: 
The bill would require the continuation of all 
terms of an expired contract until a new 
contract were to be negotiated. Since the 
legislative hearing is not part of the 
negotiation process, any change in an expired 
contract would have to come prior to the 
legislative hearing. The effect is that the 
legislative body could not consider those items 
of an impasse which were already addressed in 
an expired contract. (emphasis in original) 
The Business Council of New York State wrote on 
July 21. 1982: 
[W]here mediation and fact finding steps have 
been exhausted, the legislative body of the 
state or municipality is empowered to impose 
the final terms of employment. This bill would 
require employers "to continue all the terms of 
the expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated" (note distinction). (emphasis in 
original) 
APPENDIX B 
MEMORANDUM filed with Assembly Bill Number 6462, entitled: 
"AN ACT to amend the civil service law. in relation to 
improper employer practices" . . . . 
Concern has been expressed that the requirement 
proposed by^  "thisrbllT^-namelyT~~tfiaTr~a Iri~te rms~arnd~c o ndTti oris 
of an expired agreement, . . . continue until a new 
agreement is negotiated—is not realistic in the context of 
public sector labor negotiations. It is unclear whether the 
result of impasse resolution procedures would constitute a 
negotiated agreement . . . . 
Prior to my taking action on the bill, assurances were 
sought and received that the Senate and the Assembly will 
later this year pass a chapter amendment to the bill which 
addresses these important concerns. The amendment to the 
new subdivision (e) in section 209-a(l) will result in a 
modification of the improper practice added by the bill, so 
that the improper practice will be the refusal to continue 
all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement 
is negotiated or negotiations are resolved pursuant to the 
procedures established in section two hundred nine or 
pursuant to section two hundred twelve of Article 14, unless 
the employee organization which is a party to such agreement 
has, during such negotiations or prior to such resolution of 
such negotiations, engaged in conduct violative of 
subdivision one of section two hundred ten of such Article, 
(emphasis supplied) 
APPENDIX C 
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1982 
MR. H. MILLER: Mr. Walsh, what is the difference 
between the B print and the prior print? Do you have any 
idea? 
MR. D. WALSH: Yes, there was a provision taken out 
that dealt with legislative hearings and impasse. 
MR. H. MILLER: Mr. Walsh, we have received a 
number of communications from the public employee groups. 
This change to 7-B, does this now satisfy their criticism of 
this measure? 
MR. D. WALSH: They love it because all it does is 
just redefine current law. 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER KLAUS 
I do not find in legislative history or in other 
applicable guides to statutory interpretation the necessary 
support for the intent the majority has here attributed to 
the Legislature^ 
There may be sufficient basis for discerning a 
reasonably clear and specific purpose in the language in 
question to modify Board and Court improper practice law as 
to the subject-matter scope of an employer's duty to 
maintain the status quo established by an expired 
agreement. The history of efforts over the years to achieve 
such modification and the language of the amendment and its 
physical placement in the improper practice section of the 
statute can fairly be said to indicate such a purpose. 
There is. however, no relevant background or statutory 
context from which reasonably to infer from the words of the 
amendment a legislative desire or purpose to modify in any 
way the disputes resolution authority of legislative bodies 
under Section 209 of the statute. That section is 
physically removed from the improper practice part of the 
statute, and it deals with a different aspect of the 
statutory program. Devoted to a careful delineation of 
various mechanisms of peaceful dispute resolution. 
Section 209 has stood as a cornerstone of the Taylor Law 
structure since the beginning, antedating the improper 
Board - U-6265 - Dissent 
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practice provisions. In the sixteen years of its 
coexistence with the Taylor Law, Section 209 has been 
significantly amended in two respects: to make the 
legislative determination inapplicable to disputes in public 
education; and to provide for binding arbitration of police 
and fire disputes. Each amendment was achieved by the same 
technique: It was spelled out in carefully worded language 
specifically directed to the intended objective and it was 
physically placed in its logical position in that particular 
section of the statute. 
By contrast, the change which the majority now reads 
into the disputes resolution Section 209 is not spelled out 
in carefully worded language specifically directed to the 
purpose which the majority sees in it. The words of the 
amendment do not speak in the language of disputes 
resolution, and no modifying language at all has been 
inserted in the disputes resolution section. The amendment 
is phrased only in terms of an improper practice, appears 
only in the improper practice section, and makes no 
reference whatever to the disputes resolution provisions. 
Moreover, the intent to modify the disputes resolution 
provisions which the majority draws from the amendment has 
no previously targeted legislative history and no background 
in Court or Board decisions or in any similar appropriate 
Board - U-6265 - Dissent 
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source. There is in fact good reason to believe that the 
Legislature gave no thought to revising any part of 
Section 209 when it wrote and adopted the amendment. 
I do not believe that a true legislative purpose to 
change the disputes resolution provisions has revealed 
itself in the action of the Governor after signing the bill 
and in the subsequent debate of the Legislature itself on 
the Governor's proposals. The Governor's letter and the 
proposed revision he sent to the Legislature express no more 
than a desire on his part to reassure others, even though he 
felt assured himself, that the amendment would have no 
effect on the disputes resolution section of the statute. 
) The failure of the Legislature to enact his proposed 
clarification can be variously interpreted by reasonable 
minds. And I do not find in the short exchange on the 
Assembly floor a clear and unequivocal message of an intent 
to amend in so fundamental a way and so unusual a fashion 
the disputes resolution procedures. 
Nor do I find reasonable warrant for attributing to the 
Legislature the insubstantial, if not meaningless, intention 
to allow Section 209(e) to survive for the limited purposes 
stated in the text of the majority decision and supplemented 
by footnote comment. 
In short, I can see no compelling reason in the 
amendment for disturbing the established statutory modus 
) 
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) 
vivendi of continued peaceful coexistence between the 
improper practice and disputes resolution sections of the 
statute. 
For these reasons, I would affirm the hearing officer. 
DATED: August 9. 1983 
Albany. New York 
,%**- A^AAJL^. 
Ida Klaus. Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPL 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of. Niagara within the unit represented 
by Niagara County White Collar Employees Unit, Local 832, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., that the Niagara County Legislature and the County of Niagara 
will: 
1. Not refuse to continue the terms of an expired agreement until a 
new agreement is negotiated. 
2. Rescind immediately the legislative determination of August 3, 1982 
to the extent that it changes or modifies any of the terms of the 
agreement which expired December 31, 1981 and to restore 
simultaneously all terms of that agreement, making whole all unit 
employees and CSEA for any loss or diminution of benefits including 
interest on any sums owing to unit employees at the rate of 
3 percent per annum from August 3, 1982 to December 31, 1982 and at 
the rate of 9 percent per annum thereafter. 
Niagara County. Legislature, and .Cpunty. .of. .Niagara. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. , . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Mat ter of #2B-8/9/83 
COUNTY OF ULSTER, 
Employer/Petitioner. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2472 
ULSTER COUNTY UNIT. ULSTER COUNTY 
LOCAL 856. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES (JOSEPH KELLY, of Counsel), 
for Employer/Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (WILLIAM 
WALLENS. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Intervenor 
( ) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 5, 1982, the County of Ulster filed a petition 
seeking to remove 33 job titles from a negotiating unit 
represented by Ulster County Unit. Ulster County Local 856. 
Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) on the ground 
that the positions are supervisory. CSEA has been the 
representative of the unit since 1969. and it has consisted 
of both rank-and-file and supervisory positions throughout 
this period. This matter comes to us on the exceptions of 
the County to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
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dismissing its petition.— 
The record establishes that the 33 positions sought to 
be removed from the unit have most, if not all. of the 
following supervisory responsibilities: assign work and 
overtime, prepare work schedules, interview prospective 
employees and make effective recommendations for hiring, 
recommend employees for promotion, evaluate employee job 
performance, recommend disciplinary action, and receive and 
approve requests for leave and sick time. 
The Director dismissed the petition on the basis of 
our decision in Village of Scarsdale. 15 PERB ir3125 
(1982). The County urges that our Scarsdale decision 
effectively denies an employer-petitioner a practicable 
method of seeking the separation of supervisory personnel 
from an overall unit. Because we are now persuaded that 
the standard we adopted in our Scarsdale decision placed 
too much emphasis on the need to show actual impairment of 
effective supervision, we have examined this record on a 
different basis and conclude that the County's petition 
should be granted. Accordingly, we reverse the Director. 
1/ The County also filed an application for the 
designation of 43 employees as managerial or 
confidential. The Director granted the application in 
its entirety and no exceptions were filed to that part 
of the Director's decision. 
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DISCUSSION 
Prior to Scarsdale. we issued a decision in Buffalo 
City School District. 14 PERB ir3051 (1981), which dealt 
with a petition to remove 50 cook managers from a 13-year 
old unit of 400 blue-collar employees. There was no 
showing of conflict and the employer asserted that its 
administrative convenience would be served by continuing 
the existing combined unit. We recognized that the case 
presented a situation where two policies related to the 
"community of interest" standard set forth in §207.1(a) of 
the Act were in conflict. One was the establishment of 
separate negotiating units for rank and file employees and 
their supervisors whenever a party in interest objects to a 
combined unit; the other was the retention of long-standing 
units where the community of interest of the employees 
involved is established by the absence of evidence of any 
conflict among them. We ruled that while we might assume 
conflict of interest between supervisors and their 
subordinates, evidence of absence of conflict over a long 
period would be more persuasive in regard to this statutory 
criterion. Since the employer in Buffalo sought to retain 
the combined unit, we concluded that the third statutory 
standard (§207.1(c)) was also satisfied by doing so. 
Accordingly, we declined to remove the cook managers from 
the unit. 
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The Scarsdale case presented the question left open in 
Buffalo: the weight to be given to an employer's desire to 
remove supervisors from a combined unit on the basis of its 
2/ 
"administrative convenience".— The employer sought the 
removal of fire captains from a long-standing unit of 
firefighters. We rejected the employer's petition because 
it failed to produce any evidence of a "subversion of 
effective supervision" during the 26-year history of the 
unit. We believed that absent evidence of an actual 
adverse effect upon supervision due to the combined 
representation, the third standard was not met and that, 
accordingly, the employer's petition must be dismissed. 3_/ 
The effect of the Scarsdale decision, in conjunction 
with our earlier Buffalo decision, has been to impose an 
onerous burden of proof on an employer-petitioner seeking 
to remove any supervisory personnel from a long-standing 
unit containing rank and file employees. The employer must 
2/ While this Board has often used the phrase 
"administrative convenience" in considering the 
statutory standard set forth in §207.1(c) of the Act, 
that standard actually includes more than the 
employer's administrative convenience. That standard 
requires that a unit be compatible with the joint 
responsibilities of the public employer and employees 
to serve the public. This means that a negotiating 
unit would be inappropriate if its structure and 
composition were found to interfere with the providing 
of services to the public. 
3/ In doing so, we did not consider the additional 
argument made to us by the firefighters based on the 
special working relationship of the employees involved. 
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produce specific evidence of ineffective representation of 
the supervisors or specific evidence of ineffective 
supervision caused by the unit placement of the 
supervisors. We are now persuaded that this burden of 
proof is particularly difficult for an employer to meet. A 
challenging employee organization can expect the 
cooperation and testimony of those supporting its petition 
but the employer will have far more difficulty in obtaining 
the testimony required by our decisions. On the basis of 
further experience and consideration, we now believe that 
the consequence of the Scarsdale decision, in conjunction 
with our earlier Buffalo decision, has been to tilt the 
balance unduly in favor of maintaining existing joint units 
of supervisors and rank and file employees, regardless of 
the level of supervision, the nature and size of the unit 
and the nature of the service performed by the employees 
involved. 
In Buffalo we dealt with cook managers whose 
supervisory functions we described as "relatively a low 
level" (14 PERB at p. 3084). In Scarsdale we dealt with 
six fire captains in a 26-year-old unit with 37 
firefighters who had joint firefighting duties. In the 
instant case we deal with 33 job titles with high level 
supervisory functions in a county-wide unit of 1500 
employees. The standard which we articulated in Scarsdale 
Board - C-2472 
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can now be seen to be unduly restrictive. In considering 
whether supervisory personnel should be removed from a 
long-standing unit, we shall not henceforth impose on an 
employer-petitioner the prerequisite of producing evidence 
of actual subversion of effective supervision. Such 
evidence will, of course, continue to be relevant, but 
failure of proof in this regard will not necessarily 
require dismissal of the petition. In determining whether 
a proposed separate unit of supervisory personnel is 
compatible with the joint responsibilities of the employer 
and employees to serve the public, we shall consider, among 
other additional factors, the level of supervisory 
) functions of the employees involved, the nature and size of 
the existing and proposed units, the nature of the service 
performed by the employees involved and any special working 
relationship between them. We believe that we will then be 
able to make a more reasonable judgment when the statutory 
criteria appear to point to different results. 
Having examined the record before us we conclude that 
the removal of the supervisory positions involved herein 
would be compatible with the joint responsibilities of the 
parties and that notwithstanding a demonstrated community 
of interest between the supervisors and the rank and file, 
these high level supervisors should be removed from the 
1500-member county-wide unit of employees. 
Board - C-2472 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the 3 3 job titles set 
forth in Appendix A be, and they hereby are. removed from 
the existing unit represented by CSEA.-4/ 
DATED: August 9. 19 8 3 
Albany. New York 
S^Z^ 7 
rold R. Newman, Chairman 
/C^fruod^— 
Ida Klaus..Member 
David C. Randies, Memb 
4/ . . . -
— CSEA has not indicated any interest to separately represent 
these employees. 
APPENDIX A 
Safety Officer 
Assistant Director. Real Property Tax Service Agency 
Deputy Auditor 
DMV Supervisor 
Assistant Director. Data Processing 
Probation Supervisor. 
Risk Management Officer : 
Chief Emergency Services Dispatcher 
-Assoc-iaXe^PjQb^diC^Hea^h^Sjaqineer . i__^ __ __i^ .. .-
Director of Patient Services 
Supervising Public Health Nurse. 
Task Force Supervisor ."'.-. 
-Administrative- Director, Methadone'. 
Director, Outreach Program 
Alcohol'Abuse Program Coordinator' 
Associate Director i Mental. Health 
Director, Day Treatment Program V 
Coordinator, CSS Diversion Program 
Director, Regional Clinic. 
Director, Income Maintenance ".''•-.•, 
Director. Medical. Assistance• •; 
Director MIS7Fiscal . . 
Director, Resource Recovery 
Accounting Supervisor, Grade B ; 
Comptroller 
Director of Nursing Services 
Assistant Director of Nursing Services 
Resident Director -' 
Field Operations Manager ;.: • 
Garage- Supervisor ' 
Bridge Supervisor 
Section Supervisor, Public Works': 
Director, Social Services -
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEWBURGH. 
Respondent, 
-and-
W)CAL_5897~ INTERNATIONAL XSSOCIATION 
OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
Charging Party. 
WILLIAM M. KAVANAUGH. ESQ., for Respondent 
CRAIN & RONES, P.C. (JOSEPH P. RONES. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the 
City of Newburgh (City), respondent herein, and Local 589, 
International Association of Firefighters (Local 589), the 
charging party, to a hearing officer's decision.— The 
hearing officer dismissed a specification of the charge 
alleging that the City violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law 
in that it refused to compensate firefighters for the 
I/The instant case is one of two that were 
consolidated for consideration by the hearing officer. In 
the other, U-6631. the hearing officer dismissed all the 
specifications of the charge. No exceptions were filed to 
that part of his decision. 
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2/ purchase of helmets, rubber coats and gloves.— He found a 
violation of Article IV.A of an expired collective bargaining 
agreement of the parties, and consequently of §209-a.l(e). in 
that the City directed a firefighter to accept a temporary 
3/ promotion as acting lieutenant.— The City filed 
exceptions which argue that the hearing officer should not 
have decided either the temporary promotion or clothing 
allowance issues, but should have deferred to arbitration. 
These exceptions do not challenge the merits of the hearing 
officer's decision. Local 589 filed exceptions complaining 
that the hearing officer erred in not finding a violation of 
§209-a.l(e) in that he misinterpreted the collective 
bargaining agreement of the City and Local 589 in concluding 
that it did not require compensation for the new uniforms.—
 ( 
The City argues that the language of §205.5(d) of the 
Taylor Law which precludes the Board from exercising 
^/The hearing officer also dismissed a specification 
of the charge alleging that this conduct also violated 
§209-a.l(d). He concluded that the evidence did not support 
the specification. 
^The hearing officer dismissed a specification of the 
charge alleging that this conduct also constituted a 
violation of §209-a.l(d). His reason was that the subject 
of assignments by the City is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation and that §209-a.l(d) could not reach this 
conduct of the City. 
1/Local 589's exceptions do not complain about the 
hearing officer's dismissal of specifications of its charge 
alleging violations of §209-a.l(d). 
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jurisdiction over an alleged violation of a collective 
bargaining agreement must be read in concert with 
§209-a.l(e). which requires public employers to abide by the 
5/ 
terms of expired collective bargaining agreements.— The 
effect of this, according to the City, requires that there be 
a determination by an arbitrator that there had been a 
contract violation before this Board can find that 
§209-a.l(e) had been violated. The hearing officer rejected 
this argument. 
We affirm this determination. Section 205.5(d) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
[T]he board shall not have authority to 
enforce an agreement between an employer 
and an employee organization and shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would 
not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice. 
Section 205.5(d) applies to the interpretation of current 
agreements, while the instant case deals with an expired 
agreement. By the terms of §209-a.l(e), the City's refusal 
to continue the terms of the parties' expired agreement 
constitutes an improper practice, and it is therefore 
subject to the jurisdiction of this Board. 
.^/section 209-a.l(e) provides: 
It shall be an improper practice for a public 
employer or its agents deliberately . . . to 
refuse to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated . . . . 
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As the City's exceptions do not question the merits of 
the hearing officer's decision that it acted in violation 
of its expired agreement with Local 589 and. thereby, of 
§209-a.l(e) by temporarily promoting a firefighter, we do 
not reach this issue. This leaves standing the 
determination as made by the hearing officer. 
As found by the hearing officer, the language of the 
parties' expired collective bargaining agreement dealing 
with the clothing allowance issue requires the City to 
purchase safety clothing or equipment for firefighters in 
two instances only, upon a firefighters appointment and if 
OSHA should require a change in such clothing or 
6/ 
equipment.— The hearing officer correctly found that 
neither of the circumstances was present in the instant 
case and that the City therefore did not refuse to continue 
the terms of the expired agreement when it refused 
i./ln pertinent part, the agreement states: 
Upon permanent appointment to the Fire 
Department, the appointee is eligible for 
clothing allowance for the calendar year and 
the issuance by the department of helmet, 
rubber coat, boots and badge, without affect 
upon clothing allowance. Additionally, if 
OSHA should require changes in safety 
equipment, these items will be initially 
furnished by the Department at no cost to the 
employee. All other uniform items will be 
maintained and replaced by the employee from 
the clothing allowance. 
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to purchase helmets, rubber coats and gloves for its 
firefighters. 
The hearing officer also rejected Local 589's argument 
that the parties1 past practice establishes that the 
contract does not mean what it says but actually requires 
the City to purchase this equipment when, as here, the City 
has made a decision to change safety equipment. We agree 
with the hearing officer. On the record before us. Local 
589 has not demonstrated that Article XVI of the parties' 
expired agreement required the City to bear this particular 
cost. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing 
7/ 
officer dismissing this specification of the charge.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER: 
1. that the City continue the terms of 
Article IV.A of its expired 
collective bargaining agreement with 
Local 589; 
Z/Local 589 makes an additional argument in support 
of its charge. It asserts that the City's action is. in 
any event, a circumvention of a clear provision of the 
contract requiring the City to bear the cost of the 
replacement of uniform items required by OSHA. It asserts 
that there is a proposal pending before OSHA for the 
requirement of helmets, rubber coats and gloves as required 
by the City. Thus, according to Local 589. the City is 
anticipating an OSHA requirement. We reject this argument 
because there is no record evidence in support of it. 
Board - U-6642 
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that the City sign and post the 
notice in the form attached at 
all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate with unit employees; 
and 
that in all other respects the 
charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 9. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. 'Randies. Memb 
Board" - U-6642 
' MEMBER KLAUS CONCURRING IN THE RESULT: 
I agree with the hearing officer that the charge of 
violation of the temporary promotion provision of the expired 
agreement was properly brought and sustained as a violation 
of §209-a.l(e) because it dealt with a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation. 
While I also agree that the §209-a.l(e) charge as to the 
clothing provision should be dismissed. I do so for the 
reason that §209-a.l(e) has not created a new and independent 
improper practice relating to the violation of a term of an 
expired agreement covering a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. A charge of that kind of violation is properly 
^ . . . 
to be brought, and determined, as it was prior to the 
amendment, as an improper practice of refusal to negotiate in 
good faith under subsection (d). 
DATED: August 9. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus. Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC^EMPLOYMENT^RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Local 589 International 
Association of Firefighters that the City of Newburgh will continue the promotion 
provisions of Article IV.A of the parties' agreement which expired on 
December 31, 1982. 
City of Newburgh 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
^ - i i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e M a t t e r of //2D-8/9/83 
VILLAGE OF SKANEATELES, 
Employer. 
SKANEATELES-POLICE-BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. CASE NO. C-2522 
-and-
ONONDAGA LOCAL 834 OF THE 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
JOHN E. FERRIS. ESQ.. for Petitioner. 
EDWARD W. LAVERY. ESQ., for Employer 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (MICHAEL J. SMITH, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the petitioner 
to a decision of the Acting Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing its petition 
to establish a separate unit of four police officers which it 
seeks to represent. These employees are presently in a unit 
with blue-collar employees and dispatchers which is represented 
by the intervenor. 
In the proceeding before the Director, the parties 
stipulated, in substance, to the following: 
Since March 1972, the intervenor has 
been recognized as the exclusive 
representative of the aforesaid unit of 
employees, which currently totals 34. There 
is no claim by the petitioner that the 
intervenor has inadequately represented the 
police officers in collective negotiations or 
the administration of grievances. The 
grounds —f-o-r—s-ee-k-i-n-g—a—s-ep-a-ra-te—u-n-i-t—a-r-e-: 
that the performance by the police of their 
law enforcement duties creates a community of 
interest separate and apart from the other 
employees in the unit; and the availability 
only to the police of interest arbitration 
under Civil Service Law §209.4 to resolve 
impasses in negotiations. 
The employer is a small one with a 
population of 2700 and an area of 2.8 square 
miles. Its mayor negotiates its labor 
contracts. The employer opposes the petition 
on the ground that a separate bargaining unit 
for four employees would lead to a plurality 
of bargaining units and cause substantial 
hardship to the employer in the 
administration of its affairs. 
The intervenor opposes the petition on 
the basis of the long-standing existence of 
the bargaining unit without any actual 
conflict of interest. 
The Director dismissed the petition in reliance upon our 
decision in Village of Potsdam. 16 PERB 1P032 (1983). We 
believe that decision is not dispositive of the unit question 
raised herein. 
-3-
This Board has followed "an almost uniform practice of 
establishing separate units for policemen" (City of Amsterdam. 
10 PERB ¥3031, at p. 3061 [1977]).-/ What we referred to in 
the Amsterdam case as a "strong prevailing practice" has been 
based, in part, upon the recognition of a special and unique 
—po-lireecommunirty o1: irntererstderri;virng from their law entorcement 
duties and hazards attendant thereto, which affect the essence 
of their labor relations. Defining separate units for policemen 
is also based upon the recognition that a separate unit for such 
law enforcement employees is "compatible with the joint 
responsibilities of the public employer and public employees to 
serve the public..." (§207.1(c) of the Act)., (see Montgomery 
County. 12 PERB 1f3l26 [1979]). The policemen's primary 
commitment to law enforcement is part and parcel of their 
employer's fundamental mission to preserve public order. That 
commitment exists even in the event of a strike by other public 
employees. Such a joint responsibility to the public is unique 
to police. 
We believe that the enactment of §209.4 - establishing 
separate impasse resolution procedures for police and 
firefighters - reflects legislative recognition that police 
negotiations involve separate and unique concerns. The 
availability of those procedures only to the police members 
1/ We are unaware of any decision by this Board or the Director 
which has defined a unit to include police officers with 
civilian employees. 
_4-
of a combined unit of police and nonpolice personnel can create 
pitfalls to stable labor relations. While not alone mandating 
the fragmentation sought by the petitioner, the difference in 
applicable impasse resolution procedures is a significant and 
important reason for defining a separate unit for police 
officers. -
We did not intend our decision in Potsdam to be a departure 
from our prevailing practice or a rejection of the principles 
which we believe strongly support separate units for police 
officers. In Potsdam we intended simply to remand the 
proceeding to the Director because we believed the record was 
insufficient for us to make an appropriate unit determination. 
The intervenor herein opposes the petition because there is 
no claim by the petitioner that the intervenor had inadequately 
represented the public employees in collective negotiations or 
the administration of grievances. While many years of 
"meaningful and effective negotiations"— can be the basis for 
retaining a unit which we might not have established in the 
3/ first instance.— we do not consider this factor to be 
persuasive in the case of police officers who seek a separate 
unit, since there always remains an inherent conflict of 
interest by virtue of their law enforcement functions. 
2/ Town of Smithtown. 8 PERB 1P015 at p. 3017 (1975). 
3/ Buffalo City School District. 14 PERB 1P051 (1981). 
-5-
In the instant case the employer opposes the petition because 
a separate unit of four policemen would cause substantial 
hardship in the administration of Village affairs by creating a 
plurality of bargaining units. Such a claim of administrative 
convenience is relevant by virtue of the provisions of §207.1(c) 
-o£_t±ieJlct.—NevertJieJjs5s^^the_same_sta:tutor^Lstandaxd permits 
us to recognize that a separate unit of police officers will be 
compatible with, and indeed further.the joint responsibilities 
of the employer and employees to serve the public. Thus, with 
regard to police officers, the employer's claim of 
administrative convenience cannot be given controlling weight. 
Accordingly it continues to be our view that we should 
maintain our prevailing practice of defining separate units for 
police officers. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the decision of the Director, find 
appropriate a separate unit of police 
officers and remand the matter to the 
Director for further proceedings to determine 
the representative of the new unit. 
DATED: August. 9, 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
«3u. A & ^ - — 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. RancSles, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#3A-8/9/83 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF KENT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2603 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 456, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF KENT UNIT, PUTNAM COUNTY LOCAL 
840. CSEA, INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters, Local 456 has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
••v 847© 
Certification - C-2603 page 2 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
Custodian-caretaker, construction 
equipment operator, general fore-
man, laborer, mechanic, mechanic's 
helper, motor equipment operator, 
work foreman. 
All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters, Local 456 and 
enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 9, 198 3 
Albany, Hew York 
7
*>**-<xL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r%£&. / f^4c^<^ _ 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. Member 
- H'fi 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MOHAWK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and-
MOHAWK EMPLOYEES UNION. NYSUT. AFT, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Mohawk Employees Union. 
NYSUT. AFT has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All non-instructional employees. 
including cafeteria employees, 
custodians-cleaners, secretaries-
clerk typists, payroll clerk, 
school nurses, school attendance 
officer, bus drivers-mechanics. 
#3B-8/9/83 
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Certification - C-2639 page 2 
Excluded: Transporation Supervisor. 
Secretary to the Superintendent. 
Secretary to the Business 
Manager. Cafeteria Supervisor, 
Director of Maintenance, 
Certified Administrators and 
members of recognized units. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Mohawk Employees Union, 
NYSUT. AFT and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 9, 198 3 
Albany, New York 
-/du^Cf, £//fA je*w*t*.4*\s 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Sfcju / C ^ U ^ d ^ -
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Rand les r Memifer 
*. wm 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//3C-8/9/83 
WASHINGTON COUNTY (HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT). 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2637 
CSEAT LOCAL lOOOT^AFSCME, AFL/CIO. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294. affiliated with 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294. affiliated 
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
.-• 8174 
Certification - C-2637 page 2 
Unit: Included: Highway Department employees in 
the titles of Auto Mechanic, 
Mechanic. Highway Worker I. 
Highway Worker II. Highway Worker 
III, Carpenter, Automotive Welder 
and Bridge Repair Person. 
Excluded: All other employees^ 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 294. affiliated 
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of. 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 9. 1983 
Albany. New York 
/*H/ftA^trtA 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus. Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE. 
Employer, 
-and-
ERIE COUNTY NURSES' ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Nurses 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
#3D-8/9/83 
CASE NO. C-2638 
Certification - C-2638 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-
time employees, either licensed 
or otherwise lawfully authorized 
to practice as a registered 
professional nurse, in the 
positions listed on the attached 
sheet. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Nurses 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 9. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
i 
Sf? 
Anesthetist 
Assistant Head Nurse 
Assistant Supervising Public Health Nurse 
Charge Nurse 
Clinical Teacher 
Clinical Teacher (Regular Part Time) 
Coordinating Maternity Nurse 
Cooxdinator-,_iWe-ll—Child—Conference 
Discharge Assessment Nurse 
General Duty Nurse 
General Duty Nurse (Regular Part Time) 
Head Nurse 
Inservice Education Coordinator 
Nurse - Diabetes Teaching Service 
Nurse - Renal Teaching Service 
Nurse Clinician - Alcoholism 
Nurse Clinician (ENT) 
Nurse Clinician - Cardiovascular 
Nurse Clinician - Critical Care 
Nurse Clinician - Neurology. 
Nurse Clinician - Neurosurgery 
Nurse Clinician - Orthopedics 
Nurse Clinician - Psychiatry 
Nurse Clinician - Psychiatry (RPT) 
Nurse Clinician - Renal 
Nurse Epidemiologist 
Nurse Practitioner 
Nursing Care Coordinator 
Nursing Coordinator - Family Planning 
Nursing Inservice Coordinator 
Nursing Supervisor (Home & Infirmary) 
Nursing Team Leader 
Public Health Nurse 
Public Health Nurse Coordinator 
Psychiatric Clinical Nurse Administrator 
Registered Nurse 
Supervising Public Health Nurse 
Utilization Review Nurse 
